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FOREWORD 
This p a p e r  o f f e r s  a powerful, simple method f o r  understanding many "para- 
doxes" in social  choice and probabil i ty theory .  The approach  i s  a geometrical  one; 
t h e  underlying principle emerges  from a wide va r ie ty  of examples ranging from 
elections and agenda manipulation to gambling and conditional probabil i t ies.  
Alexander B. Kurzhanski 
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THE; SOURCE OF S O m  P A W O E S  FROM 
SOCIAL CHOICE AND PROBABTLITT 
DonaLd G. Saari 
Department of Mathematics, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois 
The social choice l i t e ra ture  and the  probability l i t e ra ture  are filled with 
descriptions of "paradoxes". A s  w e  show he re ,  many of them can b e  explained and 
extended by using the  same, simple, geometric argument. Our extensions include 
several  new resul ts  about t he  intransitivities of election results ove r  subsets of al- 
ternatives,  the cycles of agenda manipulation, gambling, and Simpson's paradox 
from conditional probability. Furthermore, we prove tha t  these paradoxes must 
accompany the  modeling in a robust fashion. Our approach appea r s  t o  be new, i t  i s  
elementary (based on the  open mapping principal), and i t  uncovers new examples. 
Indeed, one point tha t  emerges is  the  ease with which paradoxes (i.e., apparen t  
contradictions in a relationship) can ar ise .  
Our argument extends beyond social choice and probability, but we emphasize 
these two a r e a s  because of the i r  familiarity and the i r  importance as standard 
modeling tools f o r  economics and decision analysis. Examples from probability a r e  
discussed in Sections 2 and 3; examples from social choice a r e  discussed in Section 
3. To simplify the  exposition, we use discrete  random variables. However, all this 
work easily generalizes t o  more general models. 
The flavor of ou r  resul ts  is indicated by the following two prototype examples. 
In the following sections, w e  show how they are re la ted and how they can b e  ex- 
tended. 
1.1 Conditional Probability and Simpson's Paradox 
Suppose a c e r t a i n  d rug  is  t e s t ed  in Chicago (C)  a d  in Los Angeles (C'). A test 
group (T) r e c e i v e s  t h e  new drug ,  and a control  g roup  (T') r ece ived  t h e  s t andard  
t rea tment .  Some people are r e t u r n e d  t o  heal th  (H), while o t h e r s  are not  (H'). 
Suppose t h a t  in both communities t h e  new d r u g  i s  judged t o  b e  successful  because  
i t  c u r e s  t h e  sick with a h igher  r a t i o  than t h e  s t andard  t rea tment  
Is i t  possible f o r  t h e  aggregated t e s t  r e su l t s  to have  t h e  r e v e r s e  conclusion 
P(H:T) < P(H:T')? I t  is,  and th is  i s  known as Simpson's paradox.  An explanation 
(which d i f fe r s  from t h a t  given h e r e )  and how i t  r e l a t e s  to t h e  "sure thing" princi-  
ple i s  given by Blyth (1972a). Examples with r e a l  da ta  are given by Wagner (1982). 
This inconsistency phenomenon t u r n s  o u t  to b e  a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of models 
based on conditional probabil i ty o r  t h e  combination of random var iables .  When ad- 
ditional conditions are introduced,  almost any imaginable extension can  occur .  For  
instance,  suppose  t h a t  t h e  tests are conducted using facil i t ies provided by univer- 
s i t ies  (U) and p r i v a t e  l abora to r i e s  (U'). There  exis t  examples whereby t h e  new 
drug  i s  unsuccessful at each  university and at e a c h  l a b o r a t o r y  a s  w e l l  as in e a c h  
community, but  it is successful  in t h e  aggrega te ,  and t h e r e  exist examples where 
t h e  conclusions oscil late with t h e  level: t h e  new d r u g  i s  successful  at each  of t h e  
facil i t ies,  it i s  unsuccessful in each  community, and i t  i s  successful  in t h e  aggre-  
ga te ,  e t c .  
The a p p r o p r i a t e  r a t i o  of success  t o  f a i lu re  in e a c h  of t h e s e  examples can b e  
made t o  exceed  any predetermined constant .  This means t h a t  t h e r e  exis t  examples 
of d a t a  where  at each  facility t h e  probabil i ty of regaining heal th  by use  of t h e  
d r u g  i s  at l eas t  twice t h a t  obtained by t h e  s t andard  t rea tment ;  in e a c h  community, 
t h e  s tandard t rea tment  i s  at l eas t  t h r e e  times b e t t e r  than  t h e  drug;  and at t h e  to ta l  
aggregated level ,  t h e  d rug  is  at least f o u r  times b e t t e r  than t h e  s t andard  t r e a t -  
ment! 
1.2 Voting and Ranking Methods 
The aggregat ion of p r e f e r e n c e  i s  a c e n t r a l  i ssue  in t h e  social  sc iences .  A sim- 
ple system i s  voting. Here ,  severa l  pa radoxes  o c c u r  when t h e  v o t e r s  rank a s e t  of 
t h r e e  a l t e rna t ives  la , b  ,c 1 by using t h e  stanC t r d  plurali ty voting system. Suppose 
t h e r e  are nine v o t e r s  where f o u r  of them giv t h e  ranking c > a > b ,  t h r e e  give 
t h e  ranking b > a > c ,  and two give t h e  ranking a > b > c .  The g roup ' s  ranking i s  
c > b > a with a tally of 4 : 3 : 2. This ranking is inconsistent with t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a 
majority of t h e  v o t e r s  (five of them) p r e f e r  t h e  bottom ranked a l ternat ive  a t o  t h e  
top ranked a l t e rna t ives  c . 
I t  might b e  suspected t h a t  a n  election ranking of N al ternat ives  must have 
some relationship t o  how t h e  group r a n k s  at l eas t  one of t h e  p a i r s  of a l ternat ives .  
This need not b e  t h e  case. F o r  each  of t h e  N(N-1)/2 pa i r s  of a l t e rna t ives  desig- 
na te ,  in a n  a r b i t r a r y  fashion, one of t h e  a l ternat ives .  W e  show t h a t  t h e r e  exis t  
examples of vo te r s '  rankings of a l ternat ives  s o  t h a t  (1) t h e  plurali ty election 
resu l t  i s  al  > a2  > ... > a ~ ,  and (2) f o r  each  p a i r  of t h e  a l ternat ives ,  a majori ty of 
t h e  s a m e  vo te r s  p r e f e r  t h e  designated a l ternat ive .  
2. THE GENERAL RESULT 
The simple geometric p r o p e r t y  where  open s e t s  are mapped t o  open sets i s  t h e  
unifying explanation f o r  al l  th  paradoxes  descr ibed in th is  p a p e r .  The following 
s tandard statement (see Warner, 1970) suffices f o r  what follows. 
P r o p o s i t i o n  1 
Let F b e  a smooth mapping from a n  m-dimensional manifold M t o  a n  n- 
dimensional manifold N where m > n .  Let c b e  a n  in te r io r  point of N. Assume t h a t  
p in F - l ( c )  i s  an  in te r io r  point of M .  If t h e  Jacobian of F at p h a s  maximal r a n k ,  
then t h e r e  i s  an  open neighborhood of p t h a t  i s  mapped onto a n  open neighborhood 
of c .  
The proof of t h e  following theorem i l lus t ra tes  why t h e  above p r o p e r t y  i s  t h e  
source  of t h e  paradoxes.  
Theorem 1 
Consider t h e  example in Section 1.1 where a drug i s  compared with a s tandard  
t reatment .  Let A b e  t h e  var iable  represent ing t h e  seven sets 
C + C',C,C1,CU,CU',C'U, and C'U'. For  each  choice  of A ,  designate which term 
from t h e  p a i r  (P(H:TA),P(H:TtA)) i s  t o  have  t h e  l a r g e r  value. Choose a constant  
clA g r e a t e r  than  unity and e x p r e s s  each p a i r  as a r a t i o  t h a t  i s  bounded below by 
clL. T h e r e  exis t  f inite examples of d a t a  t h a t  simultaneously satisfy al l  t h e  seven 
specified inequalities. 
To prove  t h e  theorem, i t  suffices t o  show tha t ,  f o r  any choice  of signs f o r  t h e  
seven quanti t ies P(H:TA) - P(H:TrA) ,  t h e r e  exis t  sample points t h a t  real ize  them. 
View t h e s e  quanti t ies as defining t h e  seven components of a mapping F into R7. The 
choice of t h e  signs identifies a n  o r than t  B of R7. 
The origin 0 of R 7  i s  a boundary point f o r  each of t h e  o r than t s .  This "com- 
parison point" i s  used in t h e  following way. Fi rs t ,  a point p in F - ~ ( o )  i s  found s o  
t h a t  (i) i t  i s  an  in te r io r  point of t h e  domain, and (ii) t h e  Jacobian of F at p h a s  
maximal rank.  According t o  Proposit ion 1, F maps a n  open neighborhood of p onto 
an open neighborhood of 0.  This open image set meets each of t h e  o r than t s ;  in 
pa r t i cu la r  i t  meets o r than t  B. Therefore ,  t h e r e  are sample points t h a t  satisfy al l  
seven conditions simultaneously. The technical  p a r t  of t h e  proof i s  t o  define t h e  
domain s o  t h a t  F can  b e  r e p r e s e n t e d  by a smooth mapping. 
Proof 
There  are eight sets determined by t h e  intersections of t h e  sets T,C,U and 
t h e i r  compliments. They are: 
S 1  = TCU S 2  = TCU' 3.3 = TC'U S 4  = TC'U' 
S 5  = T'CU S6  = T'CU' S7 = T'C'U S 8  = T'C'U' 
Trea t  each  of these  sets as a disjoint space.  Let Xj designate t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
function of H in S .  Define 5 = X Z j  + X2j-1,  j = 1 ,..., 4,  - and 
Zj = Y  + Y 2 j - l , j  = 1 3 .  The random var iable  5 ,  which i s  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  21 
function of H o v e r  S z j  + S 2 j - 1 ,  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  resu l t s  at t h e  community level, 
while Zj = YZj  + YZj  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  final aggregated resul ts .  
If z j  denotes t h e  value of P(Xj = I), then z j  i s  in t h e  unit in terval  
I, j = 1, ... ,8 .  Let 9 designate P ( S j )  in t h e  space  usk. The 9 var iables  desc r ibe  
a simplex in R8  which is  denoted by Si  ( 8 )  and defined by 
These 1 6  var iables  are in t h e  15-dimensional space  M = l8 X Si  ( 8 ) .  
By use of t h e  s tandard relat ionship,  f o r  any set E, 
i t  follr u s  t h a t  t h e  probabil i t ies yl = P ( 5  = 1 )  and z j  = P(Zj  = 1 )  a r e  t h e  ra t ional  
functions 
and 
C o m p a r i s o n  map:  Let F:M + R~ b e  
where e j  i s  t h e  unit vec to r  in R7 with unity in i t s  j t h  component. The components 
of F r e p r e s e n t  P(H: TA ) - P(H: TA ') as A ranges  through i t s  seven values. 
Open  m a p p i n g :  Clearly, F i s  a smooth mapping. That t h e  Jacobian of F h a s  maxi- 
mal r a n k  at some preimage of 0 i s  a d i rec t  computation. Indeed, th i s  r a n k  condi- 
tion holds everywhere  excep t  on a ce r ta in  lower-dimensional subse t  of M .  These 
points of lower rank  are where e i t h e r  t h e  y values o r  t h e  z values are uniquely 
determined because  t h e  corresponding p a i r s  of x o r  y are equal. 
The signs chosen f o r  t h e  seven quanti t ies determine an  o r than t  of R7, denoted 
by B. By construction,  all t h e  sample points with th i s  behavior are in U = F-'(B). 
By t h e  continuity of F,U i s  a n  open se t ;  w e  must show t h a t  i t  i s  nonempty. The Jaco- 
bian of F h a s  maximal rank at some in te r io r  point of M in F-'(o), s o  F maps a n  open 
s e t  from M onto a n  open set of 0. This open set meets B .  Consequently F-'(B) i s  
nonempty . 
?\Text w e  show t h a t  U contains points t h a t  can b e  identified with a f inite da ta  
se t .  Any ra t ional  point will suffice.  A multiple of t h e  common denominator of d is 
t h e  to ta l  number of subjects.  The same multiple of t h e  numerator of d corresponds 
t o  t h e  cardinali ty of S f ,  and i t  s e r v e s  as a multiple of t h e  denominator of z j .  Be- 
cause  t h e  ra t ional  points are dense,  t h e r e  i s  a n  infinite set of ra t ional  points in 
F - ~ ( B ) .  Each point can b e  identified with a n  infinite number of d i f ferent  f inite 
da ta  sets. 
The se t  F-'(o): It remains tha t  the  inequalities can b e  bounded below by the  desig- 
nated constants. Once the  values of 4 a r e  specified, the  inequalities are of the  
type z j  > dAXj +4 with a similar relationship y and z .  Let q = ( q l ,  . . . , q , )  b e  a point 
in B. The set F-'@ ) is  given by equations of the  form z j  - z j  +4 = lqjl with similar 
equations f o r  y and z .  These equations define lower-dimensional hyperplanes in 
t he  domain, s o  t h e r e  are points in U satisfying inequalities of t he  form 
The assertion follows if t h e r e  is  a point in U such tha t  t he  right-hand sides of 
these inequalities are bounded below by dA,  with similar statements f o r  y and z .  
These inequalities are satisfied if t he  values of the  denominators on the  right-hand 
sides can be chosen t o  be a rb i t ra r i ly  small. This involves a d i rec t  computation 
tha t  is  easily done because F-'(o) contains the  intersection of 0 X Si ( 8 )  and the 
boundary of U. The points are chosen arbi t rar i ly  close t o  this set. 
Comments: 
( 1 )  The basic idea of this  proof extends t o  all  t h e  paradoxes discussed here .  
Individual comparisons are one dimensional. When several  comparisons 
are made, they m u s t  be  viewed as defining a comparison mapping F with a 
higher-dimensional range space. A higher-dimensional space admits sym- 
metries and cycles, so  i t  should be expected tha t  these cycles are mani- 
fested as paradoxes by the  comparisons. To prove tha t  all the sym- 
metries are admitted, locate a "comparison point" on the  boundary of 
each of the  comparison regions. Next, show tha t  t he  image of F includes 
an open set about t he  comparison point. The intersection of this  open set 
with each comparison region is a nonempty open set. Because F is  con- 
tinuous, this  means tha t  t h e r e  is  a nonempty set of points in the  domain 
with t he  desired propert ies .  To complete t he  proof, impose conditions so  
tha t  in each of these sets in the  domain t h e r e  exist points tha t  are identi- 
fied with sample points from the model. This simple idea is  t he  essence of 
ou r  explanation fo r  all the  paradoxes in this  paper .  
(2) The number of possible, paradoxial relationships is  determined by the  di- 
mension of the  domain fo r  a comparison mapping. If this  dimension 
exceeds tha t  of the  range, then the comparison mapping is  not "com- 
plete"; t h e r e  exist  additional relationships t h a t  may define more complex 
paradoxes .  A s  a corol lary ,  t h e  above illustration and extension of 
Simpson's paradox is  not t h e  "best possible" resul t .  The domain of F i s  
15 dimensional while t h e  range  is  only seven dimensional; e ight  more com- 
par isons  using these  var iables  c a n  b e  added. (They may involve di f ferent  
levels of aggregation,  waiting times, e tc . )  
(3) Other  conclusions a r e  derived from t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  of F-l. 
(i) I t  i s  natura l  t o  determine t h e  limits of a paradox. (This i s  i l lustrat-  
ed in Theorem 1 with t h e  asser t ion t h a t  dA i s  not bounded above.) 
Often, as f o r  th is  model, these  limits are determined by t h e  p roper -  
t i e s  of t h e  points n e a r  t h e  intersection of F-'(o) and t h e  boundary 
of t h e  domain. 
(ii) In o r d e r  f o r  a paradox (described by B) t o  occur ,  we may need a 
c e r t a i n  number of d a t a  points. The minimal size is  given by t h e  smal- 
lest "lowest common denominator"of t h e  admissible points in 
F-~(B)  = U. 
(iii) The probabil i ty t h a t  a paradox (described by B) o c c u r s  is given by 
t h e  measure of a probabil i ty distr ibution o v e r  t h e  open set F-~(B). 
(4) Other  conclusions are der ived from t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  image of F. For  
instance,  t h e  image contains a n  open set about  t h e  origin, so it meets any 
sector defined by a specified r a t i o  of t h e  outcomes; e.g., 
The above  shows t h a t  t h e r e  are sample points t h a t  satisfy these  condi- 
tions. 
(5) To avoid t h e  above behavior,  t h e  Jacobian of F cannot b e  of maximal 
rank .  This singularity const ra int  becomes a necessary condition t o  avoid 
a paradox.  Often, as f o r  t h e  above model, these  lower-dimensional singu- 
l a r i t y  conditions correspond t o  familiar const ra ints  such as t h e  "in- 
dependence of random variables". 
This approach  c a n  b e  used as long as t h e  components of a comparison mapping 
are smooth functions. These components could b e  functional combinations of pro-  
babilities, expected values, t h e  var ious  moments, waiting times, loss functions, de- 
cision rules ,  corre la t ion indices, sca t t e r ing  indices, covariance,  etc. If t h e  open 
mapping condition holds a t  a comparison point, then all possible comparisons c re 
realized. In th i s  way i t  is easy t o  show t h a t  t h e r e  exis t  examples i l lustrat ing,  ' o r  
instance, tha t  t he  expected value may satisfy E (X) > E (Y), yet E (J' (X)) < E (J' (Y)) 
f o r  some monotonically increasing function j' , and tha t  cer ta in  decision rules  may 
be  inconsistent with o the r  measures. (Indeed, a discrete  version of this can be  
used t o  explain the  Arrow social choice paradox.) Theorem 2 i s  t he  formal state- 
ment tha t  covers  all these situations. 
Before stating Theorem 2, w e  formally define the  s t ruc tura l  relationship 
between a comparison point and a comparison region. 
D e f i n i t i o n  
Let a topological space  N be  partitioned. A comparison point is a boundary 
point f o r  each parti t ion set. For a given comparison point p ,  a comparison re- 
g i o n  is a parti t ion set such tha t  t h e  closure of i ts  inter ior  contains p .  
D e f i n i t i o n  
Let F : M  -, N be  a comparison mapping f o r  a given model. A point in M is an 
admissible point if i t  can b e  identified with a sample f o r  t he  model. 
Theorem 2 
Let F:M -, N be  a smooth comparison mapping where t he  dimension of M is  
bounded below by the  dimension of N. Assume tha t  t he  admissible points form a 
dense set in M .  Let c be  a comparison point in N. If p in F-'(c) is  an inter ior  
point of M such tha t  t h e  Jacobian of F at p has maximal rank ,  then the  behavior 
characterized by any comparison region of N is admitted. 
Example  
Consider t he  following dice game. Each of the  players rolls his own weighted 
die. (Each die is  marked in the  standard fashion.) On each roll ,  t he  winner is  the  
player tha t  rolled the  l a r g e r  face value. For each choice of k = 1, ..., 4, t h e  losing 
player pays t he  winning player t he  difference between the  face  values raised t o  
the  k t h  power. For each of the  four  choices of k ,  arb i t ra r i ly  select  a die t o  have 
the  l a rge r  expected payoff, and then a rb i t ra r i ly  select a die t o  have the  higher 
probability of winning a roll .  I t  i s  a d i rec t  consequence of Theorem 2 tha t  t he  dice 
can be  weighted in such a fashion that  all five selected conditions are satisfied 
simultaneously. This illustrates t he  possible incompatibili .y among reward func- 
tions and the  distributions. 
A s  a specia l  case (K1 = I ) ,  t h e  following demonstrates t h a t  t h e  more probable  
of two events  may have t h e  longer waiting time. 
Corollary 2.1 
Let each  of t h e  two u r n s  U1 and U 2  contain r e d  and black balls. Each u r n  is  
randomly sampled without replacement.  For  a positive in teger  k  , l e t  w j  (k ) be  t h e  
probability t h a t  i t  t akes  at l eas t  k  t r i e s  be fore  a r e d  ball is se lected from u r n  U j ,  
j = 1 ,2 .  Let k l  # k 2 .  For  each  of t h e  two pa i r s  ( w l ( k S ) , w 2 ( k S ) ) , s  = 1 3 ,  choose 
t h e  value t h a t  is t o  b e  t h e  l a r g e r .  There  exis t  examples of d a t a  s o  t h a t  both condi- 
tions are satisfjed simultaneously. 
Outline of the proof 
W e  proof t h e  specia l  case where K1 = 1  and K2 = 2.  The general  case follows 
in much t h e  same manner. 
The domain of t h e  comparison mapping F i s  I x I x R +  where R +  i s  t h e  half- 
line of positive numbers. A point in t h e  domain i s  denoted by ( z ,  y , z ) .  Let 
b e  a mapping into R'. A t  t h e  ra t ional  points in t h e  domain, F can  b e  identified with 
t h e  mapping (W i ( l )  - w ' ( 1 ) ,w  1(2)  - w ' ( 2 ) ) .  This identification follows by assuming 
t h a t  t h e r e  are zzn r e d  and zn ( 1  - z) black balls in U1 and y n  r e d  and n (1--y ) 
black balls in U z ,  and by choosing a n  a p p r o p r i a t e  value f o r  t h e  pa ramete r  n . 
The comparison point i s  0  = (0,O). Any domain point p of t h e  form ( z , z , l )  i s  
in F - l ( 0 ) .  The gradient  of t h e  f i r s t  component of F i s  ( 1 ,  - 1,O); t h e  gradient  of 
t h e  second component evaluated at p i s  
[l + ( l -Z=)zn,  - + ( 1  -22 )m ; ,  (2 -1)z  
zn -1 z n  -1 (zn -1)' I 
where z = 1 .  Clearly, t h e s e  two vec to rs  are l inearly independent. This completes 
t h e  proof.  
The conclusion of th is  corol lary  holds even if one of these  p a i r s  is r ep laced  
with t h e  p a i r  of expected waiting times. However, t h e  conclusion does not  hold if 
t h e  sampling is  with replacement,  o r  if t h c  number of balls i s  t h e  same f o r  each  
urn. For  each  of these  models, t h e  z terr.1 does not  a p p e a r  in t h e  definition of F. 
A s  a resu l t ,  t h e  th i rd  component of t h e  I -adient is ze ro ,  and t h e  second is t h e  
negative of t he  f i r s t .  Therefore,  the  Jacobian of the  comparison mapping is  singu- 
la r .  This i l lustrates comment (5). 
A more interesting paradox is  obtained by combining the  model in Theorem 1 
with t he  one given above. Here,  several  pa i r s  of urns  with r e d  and black balls are 
used. A s  t h e  contents of t he  urns  a r e  combined in a specified way, the  urn with the  
higher probability of selecting a r ed  ball may change with the  level of aggregation. 
Furthermore, t h e  waiting time t o  select a r e d  ball may vary. However, as demon- 
s t ra ted  above, t o  obtain these examples, often w e  need the  e x t r a  degrees  of free- 
dom offered by varying the  number of balls p e r  urn.  Also, the  number of indepen- 
dent comparisons is bounded by t h e  dmension of t he  domain. 
Several  interesting paradoxes from population dynamics involve only a small 
number of comparisons, so i t  i s  t o  use Theorem 2 to  explain and extend them (see, 
f o r  example, t h e  paper  by Vaupel and Yashin, 1985). However, often these exam- 
ples, as given by Vaupel and Yashin, a r e  based on continuous random variables. To 
use Theorem 2, t h e  continuous variables are approximated by discrete  valued ran- 
dom variables. Alternatively, Proposition 1 can be  extended, in the  obvious 
fashion, t o  permit M t o  be  a function space. In this way, t he  examples of Vaupal 
and Yashin can be  t rea ted  directly. 
Another source  of paradoxes subsumed by Theorem 2 is  Blyth's paper  (1972 
b). One of his paradoxes with random variables X and Y has P(X > Y) as close t o  
unity as desired, even though P(X < a )  < P ( Y  < a )  f o r  all choices of a: This, of 
course,  is  a n  example of t h e  boundary behavior of t he  comparison mapping. Both 
Blyth (1972 b) and Vaupel and Yashin (1985) descr ibe t he  paradoxes in terms of ex- 
amples. The above treatment explains and unites them, i t  shows tha t  they can be  
extended in severa l  ways, and i t  proves tha t  t he  paradoxes are "robust" in tha t  
they are satisfied by open sets of examples. 
Theorem 1 and its generalization to a set of N character is t ic  functions are 
corollaries of Theorem 2. The only surprising fea ture  of the generalization is  that  
the  dimension of t he  domain f o r  a comparison mapping can be  very large. To see  
this, let t he  f i r s t  N-1 character is t ic  functions define zN-l sets. The last  random 
variable is  t rea ted  as a character is t ic  function on each set. Thus, t he  domain of a 
comparison mapping has t he  dimension zN-l + (zN-l - 1 )  = zN - 1. According to  
comment (2) this means tha t  up t o  zN - 1 functional relationships can be  defined 
from these random vari3bles with possible concomitant unexpected behavior. 
W e  conclude th is  section with a par t i a l  converse  f o r  Theorem 2. I t  asserts 
t h a t  if a ce r ta in  set of examples can  b e  found, then  examples of al l  types  exist .  
Such a resu l t  i s  of value because  when t h e  dimension of t h e  r a n g e  space  i s  suffi- 
ciently l a r g e  i t  may be  difficult t o  verify t h e  rank  condition. However, t h e  speci- 
fied set of examples might be  identified by a computer s e a r c h .  For  simplicity, w e  
r e s t r i c t  a t tent ion t o  l inear  comparison maps. 
Corollary 2.2 
Suppose t h a t  F i s  a l inear  comparison mapping from a l inear  s p a c e  t o  a r a n g e  
s p a c e  R k .  Assume t h a t  t h e  Zk o r t h a n t s  of R k  are comparison regions .  If t h e r e  ex- 
i s t  2(k + 1 examples, each  in a different  comparison region,  t h e n  F h a s  maximal 
rank  and a l l  possible comparisons are admitted. 
Proof 
The image of a l inear  space  under  a l inear  mapping i s  a l inea r  space.  If th i s  
image s p a c e  h a s  dimension k ,  then t h e  conclusion follows. By assumption, k image 
points can b e  found t h a t  do not  l ie in t h e  same (k -1)-dimensional subspace.  This 
completes t h e  proof.  
Extensions are obvious. For  instance,  t h e  proof r e q u i r e s  only k examples 
t h a t  are not in t h e  same (k -1)-dimensional plane. For  o t h e r  choices  of comparison 
regions,  t h e  emphasis i s  placed on t h e  geometry defined by t h e  image points with 
r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  of t h e  image set. 
3 RANKING PARADOXES 
A r i c h e r  assortment of paradoxical  behavior emerges from multivalued ran-  
dom variables.  (This i s  because  t h e  dimension of t h e  domain f o r  a comparison map- 
ping inc reases  with t h e  number of values admitted by a random variable.)  W e  illus- 
trate th is  with severa l  new resu l t s  about  ranking and voting procedures .  
Our main resu l t s  concern weighted o r  positional voting. This i s  defined in t h e  
following way. To rank  t h e  N al ternat ives ,  a l ,  ..., aN, choose N s c a l a r  weights 
(zlil, ..., wN) where w j  2 wk if and only if j < k and where w > w~ 2 0. Each v o t e r  
l ists  his ranking of t h e  A! al ternat ives  on a ballot. To tally a ballot, wj points are 
assigned t o  t h e  j t h  ranked  a l ternat ives ,  j = 1, ..., N. In t h e  obvious way, t h e  
grq.rp 's  ranking of t h e  a l ternat ives  is  determined by t h e  sum of t h e  assigned 
w e  ghts. 
The weights define a voting vector  WN = (wl, ..., wN) in RN. For plurality vot- 
ing, the voting vector  is (1,0, ..., 0). Another well-known voting system, called the  
Borda count, is defined by the  voting vector BN = (N,N - 1, ..., 1). (If a voting vec- 
t o r  is a linear combination of BN and EN = (1, ..., I ) ,  then we call the  system a Borda 
system. This is  because t he  election resul t  f o r  any Borda system always agrees  
with the  resul t  when BN is  used to  tally the  ballots (see Saar i  (1982.)) 
This tallying process  can be  identified with the expected value of multivalued 
random variables.  For N alternatives,  t h e r e  are N! different ways t o  rank the  N 
alternatives. Since the sum assigned to  any alternative is a l inear  relationship, 
t he  group's ranking is  not a l te red  should each sum be divided by the  total  number 
of voters. This means tha t  t h e  number of voters  is  replaced with t he  fraction of 
t he  voters  with each ranking. In this  way the  domain fo r  this problem can be  iden- 
tified with (the rational points in) t he  simplex Si(N!). The simplex is  in the  posi- 
tive or thant  of an N!-dimensional space. If Aj is  the  random variable assigned to  
alternative a j ,  then P(A, = wk)  denotes t h e  fraction of t h e  voters  who rank  the 
j t h  alternative in the  K~~ place. Let A b e  t he  vec tor  valued random variable 
(A1, ..., AN). A point in Si(N!) can be  viewed as being a probability distribution, and 
s o  t he  tally of t he  ballots can b e  identified with t he  expected value E(A). 
The following definitions are used in what follows. 
Definition 
A voters '  profi le  i s  a listing of each voter ' s  ranking of t h e  N alternatives.  
Definition 
The voting vector WN defines a reverse  n e u t r a l  system if 
WN + (wN ,..., w = CEN = (C ,..., C) f o r  some sca la r  C. 
A Borda system is always r eve r se  neutral .  An easy algebraic argument demon- 
s t r a t e s  that  the space of r eve r se  neutral  systems i s  a hyperplane of R N  with di- 
mension 1 + [N/2] where [I denotes the  "greatest  integer function". A basis f o r  
this hyperplane can b e  computed directly.  For N = 3 only t he  Borda systems are 
r eve r se  neutral .  For N = 4, a basis fo r  the  hyperplane is  given by E 4 ,  and 
(2,1,1,0). For  N = 5, a basis is E5,B5 and (2,1,1,1,0); etc. 
Although weighted voting systems a r e  an important class of voting methods, 
t he  interpretat ion of election results is  problematic. This is  illustrated by the  fol- 
lowing theorem which includes Example 2 a s  a special case.  
Theorem 3 
Let N 2 3. Let ALk be  the  subset [aL ,  ..., ak 1. Let Wk be  the  voting vector  used 
t o  rank ALk. Assume that  wk is  not r eve r se  neutral ,  k = 3, ..., N. For each of 
N(N - ) / 2  pa i r s  of alternatives,  a rb i t ra r i ly  designate one of t he  alternatives.  A r -  
bitrarily choose a ranking RKk f o r  t he  set ALk,k = 3, ..., N. There exist  profiles of 
voters  such tha t  (i) t he  election resul t  f o r  ALk is RKk ,k = 3, ... ,N, and (ii) f o r  each 
pair  of alternatives,  a majority of these same voters  p r e f e r  t he  designated alter- 
native. 
The proof of this theorem and an extension a r e  given in Section 4. 
A simple consequence of this theorem is  tha t ,  if a Borda system is not used, 
then t h e r e  are profiles of voters  where most of t he  vo te rs  p r e f e r  al  t o  a2,  most 
p re f e r  a2 t o  as ,  most p re f e r  al  t o  a3,  yet  the  election resul t  is  a 3  > a2  > a l .  The 
implied ranking obtained by majority vote over  the  pa i r s  of alternatives is  t he  re- 
versal  of t he  election result! (In t he  example in Section 1.2, such a profile is  given 
f o r  plurality voting.) A more striking example is  tha t  f o r  N = 5 t h e r e  i s  a profile 
of voters  such tha t  majority votes determine the  rankings a, > a, +l f o r  j = 1 ,  ..., 4, 
a5  > a l  [ these five alternatives from a cycle1 a 4  > aj  f o r  j = 1,2,al > a3,  and 
aj  > a5 f o r  j = 2,3, and the  plurality election resul ts  of A L j , j  = 3,4,5, a r e  
a l  > a3 > a2,a2 > a3  > a l  > a4 ,  and a3  > al  > a5 > a 2  > a4  respectively. Other 
examples are limited only by the  imagination of the  designer. 
By use of different techniques, Fishburn (1981) proved Theorem 3 f o r  the  spe- 
cial case N = 3. (More accurately,  Fishburn gave a proof only f o r  t he  f i r s t  exam- 
ple above. However, i t  i s  possible t ha t  his approach extends t o  include ou r  gen- 
eral statement f o r  N = 3.) For  N > 3,  t he  f i r s t  conclusion without the  second is  a 
special  case of a resul t  given by Saar i  (1984). 
The second p a r t  of t he  theorem is  of independent interest .  Essentially, i t  as- 
serts t ha t  if t he  pairs  of alternatives are ranked by majority voting, then any type 
of cycle, subcycle, etc. ,  can occur.  To highlight this resul t ,  we restate it.  
Definition 
Let N => 3. For  1 S k < j S N, le t  Rkj b e  t h e  set lak > a j , a j  > ak j .  Let t h e  
space  of b inary rankings BR be  t h e  ca r tes ian  product  of t h e  N(N -1)/2 sets R k j .  
An element of BR i s  a sequence t h a t  imposes a n  o rder ing  f o r  each  of t h e  N(N -1)/2 
p a i r s  of a l ternat ives .  These binary rankings need not be  t ransi t ive ,  n o r  need they 
satisfy any o t h e r  consistency requirement.  
Corollary 3.1 
Let q b e  a n  element BR. There  exis t  examples of voters '  prof i les  such t h a t ,  
f o r  each p a i r  of a l ternat ives ,  a majority of t h e  same v o t e r s  have t h e  ranking 
specified by q . 
The remainder of th is  section is  devoted to ex t rac t ing  some of t h e  consequences of 
Theorems 3 and Corollary 3.1. We start by obtaining new resu l t s  about  those  
schemes t h a t  depend on majority votes  o v e r  p a i r s  of a l ternat ives  (see  t h e  exposi- 
t o r y  a r t i c l e  by Nierni and Riker  (1976).) For  example, a n  a l t e rna t ive  is called a 
Condorcet w i n n e r  i t  i s  r ece ives  a majority vote  when compared agains t  each  of 
t h e  o t h e r  a l ternat ives .  A Condorcet winner does  not  always exis t  (e.g., t h e  above,  
second example), so o t h e r  schemes have been proposed to determine t h e  winning 
a l ternat ive .  The following definition a p p e a r s  to include a l l  methods based on t h e  
ordinal  rankings. 
Definition 
A b i n a r y  ranking  method i s  a nonconstant mapping from a subset  of BR into 
lal, ... ,aN j .  That is, based on t h e  ordinal  rankings of p a i r s  of a l ternat ives ,  one of 
t h e  N al ternat ives  is selected. 
Examples 
(1) A Condorcet winner i s  a binary ranking method. The subset  is t h e  set of 
a l l  elements of BR where some one a l ternat ive  is  p r e f e r r e d  to all o t h e r  
a l ternat ives .  
(2) An obvious extension of t h e  Condorcet winner is t o  select t h e  a l t e rna t ive  
t h a t  wins t h e  l a rges t  number of pairwise comparisons. This extensio-.. ad- 
mits a l a r g e r  subset  of elements from BR. 
(3) Suppose N - 1 al ternat jves  are proposed t o  r e p l a c e  t h e  s t a tus  quo, a l .  
The selected a l ternat ive  is  al if and only if al  i s  a Condorcet winner. If 
not ,  then from t h e  set of those  a l ternat ives  t h a t  b e a t  a l ,  se lec t  t h e  one 
t h a t  wins t h e  most pairwise comparisons. 
(4) A commonly used binary ranking method i s  a n  agenda. 
Definition 
Let N > 3. An agenda is  a n  o r d e r e d  listing of t h e  N al ternat ives .  The f i r s t  two 
listed a l ternat ives  are voted upon. The a l ternat ive  receiving t h e  majority vote  i s  
then compared with t h e  t h i r d  l isted a l ternat ive .  This i tera t ive ,  pairwise comparis- 
on p rocedure  i s  continued t o  t h e  end of t h e  listing. The remaining a l t e rna t ive  is  
t h e  se lected a l ternat ive .  
The following statement extends severa l  r esu l t s  from "agenda manipulation" 
(see ,  for example, McKelvey (1976) and Plot t  and Levine (1978)). I t  implies t h a t  
t h e  r i g h t  t o  set a n  agenda f o r  a meeting i s  a potential  s o u r c e  of power ( the  f i r s t  
conclusion) t h a t  may lead t o  a n  undesired outcome ( the  second conclusion). 
Corollary 3.2 
Let N > 3. There  exis t  vectors '  prof i les  and N agendas such t h a t ,  when t h e  
same vote r s  use  t h e  j t h  agenda,  t h e  outcome i s  a,. j = 1. ... .N. F o r  N > 3,  t h e r e  
exis t  voters '  profi les and N agenda so t h a t  t h e  above holds even though all the 
voters p r e f e r  a g  lto a4,  a 4  t t o ]  as ,  ..., land] a ~ - ~  to a .  
An interes t ing f e a t u r e  of th i s  corol lary  i s  t h a t  f o r  a fixed prof i le  of voters ,  
t h e  winning a l ternat ive  va r ies  o v e r  a l l  possible outcomes as t h e  "seeding", o r  t h e  
choice of t h e  agenda,  changes. The proof depends on t h e  fact t h a t  majority, pai r -  
wise voting can define any des i red  cycle  and subcycle. Thus, th i s  conclusion ex- 
tends t o  t h e  o t h e r  binary ranking methods t h a t  depend on t h e  initial seeding. This 
includes tournaments, whether  single, double, o r  k -fold elimination, c e r t a i n  
h ie ra rch ica l  methods, etc. In pa r t i cu la r ,  because a change in t h e  seeding changes  
t h e  definition of a binary ranking method, Corollary 3.2 i s  a special  case of t h e  
following. 
Corollary 3.3 
Let Pl and P2 be  different mappings from BR to la l,...,aN1. There exist  pro- 
files of voters  s o  t ha t  the outcome of the  two binary voting methods differ.  
The next resu l t  compares the  outcome of a binary ranking method with t he  
election resul ts  of a weighted voting system. A s  special  cases,  i t  shows tha t  a Con- 
dorce t  winner, or t he  resu l t  of an  agenda, need not ag ree  with an election ranking. 
Corollary 3.4 
Let N > 3. Let the  s e t  Alk  be  ranked with t he  voting vector  Wk ,K = 3, ..., N. 
Let a binary ranking method b e  given. Assume tha t  Wk,k = 3, ..., N, is not r eve r se  
neutral. Let Rkk ,k  = 3, ..., N, by any ranking of Alk, and l e t  aj be  an  a rb i t r a ry  ele- 
ment in the  image of the  binary ranking method. There exist  voters '  profiles such 
tha t  (i) the  election resul t  of Alk,K = 3, ..., N, and (ii) the  binary ranking method 
selects aj. 
A s  a consequence of this theorem, t he re  is a profile of voters  s o  tha t  the i r  plurali- 
ty election ranking of Sk is  al > a2  > ... > ak if k is even and t h e  r eve r se  of this  if 
k is odd, and the  Condorcet winner is al .  
This chaotic s ta te  of affairs  cannot be  eliminated if the  selection method is 
defined to combine, in some way, the  election resul ts  over  all  of subsets 
Alk,K = 2, ..., N. For instance, in a run-off election, the  lower ranked alternatives 
are dropped, and the  remaining set is reranked in a separa te  election. The follow- 
ing definition extends this notion. 
Definition 
A dynamica l  selection process  consists of (i) a set of voting vectors  
1 WN,. .. , W3, (1,O) 1 ,  (ii) ru les  tha t  eliminate a specified, positive number of alterna- 
tives from a se t  of k alternatives,  k = 2, ..., N, and (iii) a selection function. The 
procedure is defined in the  following way. The set AIN is  ranked by using WN. 
Then, based on the  elimination rule  fo r  the  N alternatives,  N-s alternatives are 
eliminated. The remaining set of s alternatives is ranked by using W,. Iteratively, 
this procedure is  continued. Based on these election rankings, the  nonconstant 
selection procedure selects one alternz tive. 
Examples 
(1) The s tandard  "run-off" election is  a dynamical procedure .  At each  s tep ,  
t h e  bottom ranked  a l ternat ive  is  eliminated. The se lected a l ternat ive  is  
t h e  one remaining at t h e  end of t h e  process .  
(2) This run-off p rocedure  can b e  generalized in t h e  following way. Choose a 
positjve in teger  k < N. The elimination p rocedure  i s  t h e  same as in (I), 
but t h e  selection r u l e  se lects  t h e  top  ranked  a l t e rna t ive  from t h e  elec- 
t ion ranking of k alternatives.  If k = 2, th i s  i s  t h e  above p rocedure .  If 
k = N ,  th i s  i s  a s tandard election procedure .  
(3) The run-off p r o c e d u r e  can eliminate more than one a l ternat ive  at each  
s tage.  For  instance,  a f t e r  t h e  N al ternat ives  are ranked,  all b u t  t h e  top 
two a l ternat ives  may b e  dropped. 
(4) Let al r e p r e s e n t  t h e  s t a tus  qua, and let aj, j = 2, ..., N r e p r e s e n t  t h e  con- 
tending a l ternat ives .  Use WN t o  r a n k  t h e  N al ternat ives .  If al i s  t h e  t o p  
ranked  a l ternat ive ,  i t  i s  declared t h e  winner. If i t  i s  not, then  eliminate 
al and r a n k  t h e  remaining a l ternat ives  with WN The t o p  ranked  a l t e r -  
native from this  election is  declared t h e  winner. 
(5) The elimination r u l e  may depend on t h e  a l ternat ives .  For  instance,  t h e  
p rocess  descr ibed in (4) c a n  b e  modified t o  eliminate not only al but  also 
a l l  a l t e rna t ives  ranked  below al in t h e  f i r s t  election. 
As a specia l  case ,  t h e  following asserts t h a t  t h e  winner of a run-off election need 
not b e  a Condorcet winner. 
Corollary 9.5 
Let N > 3. Assume t h a t  a binary ranking method and a dynamical selection 
p rocess  are given. Suppose t h a t ,  f o r  each  K r 3, t h e  weight v e c t o r  Wk i s  not re- 
v e r s e  neutra l .  Arbi t rar i ly  se lec t  aj from t h e  r a n g e  of t h e  binary ranking method 
and ak from t h e  r a n g e  of t h e  dynamical process.  There  exis t  prof i les  of v o t e r s  so 
t h a t  t h e  binary ranking outcome i s  aj while t h e  dynamical method outcome i s  at. 
Recently t h e r e  h a s  been in te res t  in election p rocedures  where a v o t e r  can  
choose a voting v e c k r  t o  tal ly h i s  ballot. 
Definition 
A mul t ip le  voting system used t o  rank N alternatives is  determined by a set 
MN of voting vectors  where at least  two of these vectors  and EN are linearly in- 
dependent. Each vector  ranks  t h e  N alternatives on his ballot, and then h e  selects 
a vector  from MN t o  tally his ballot. 
Examples 
(1) Bullet voting: The defining set of voting vectors  is  
M = ( 2 . 0 , .  0 ( 1 . .  0 ( 1 1 0  . 0 . This procedure w a s  used during 
the  1970s f o r  some legislative offices in Illinois. 
(2) Cardinal voting: The set MN contains all  voting vectors  where t he  com- 
ponents sum t o  unity. Occasionally, cardinal voting is used t o  define 
rankings f o r  methods from decision analysis. 
(3) Approval voting: The defining set of N-1 vectors  is  
I (l,O, ... ,O), ( l , l ,O, ... ,O), ... , (1,1, ... ,1,0) j. For this  method, which w a s  intro- 
duced by R. Weber, among others ,  and ithas been analyzed by Brams and 
Fishburn (1982), a voter  indicates e i t he r  approval o r  disapproval of 
each alternative.  
Often t h e  resul ts  of multiple voting systems are compared with t h e  Condorcet 
winner. The following shows tha t  t he  resul ts  can be  incompatible. 
Corollary 3.6 
Let N r 3. Let a binary ranking method be  given. Let Mk define a multiple 
voting system f o r  dlk ,k = 3, ..., N. Assume tha t ,  f o r  each k ,Mk contains at least  one 
vector  t ha t  is  not reverse  neutral .  Let Rkk be  a ranking f o r  dlk, and le t  aj be  an  
alternative in t h e  range of t h e  binary ranking method. There exis t  voters '  pro- 
files s o  t ha t  (i) the multiple election resul t  f o r  A l k  is  Rkk,k = 3, ..., N, and (ii) t h e  
binary ranking outcome is aj . 
A consequence of this resul t  is that ,  f o r  any choice of s ,  t he re  exis t  examples 
where t h e  alternative ranked in sth place in an approval voting election is  t h e  
Condorcet winner, and the re  exis t  examples where the  results based upon approval 
v3ting are a4 > a3 > a2 > al f o r  t he  set of four alternatives,  al > a2 > a f o r  t he  
Q. ~ b s e t  of t h r ee  alternatives,  and a2 is  a Condorcet winner. 
I t  follows from this approach tha t  the  pr inc ipa l  cause of the social choice 
paradoxes i s  the difference between the dimensions of the domain a n d  the 
range of a comparison mapping (see Section 2 ,  comment ( 2 ) ) .  To model a weighted 
election f o r  N alternatives,  t he  domain S i ( N ! )  has  dimension N!-1. The image is  
E ( A ) .  Because t h e  domain is  Si  ( N ! ) ,  this image is  in t he  simplex Si ( N )  in R ~ .  (The 
sum of the  components of wN define this simplex. Without loss of generality, as- 
sume tha t  this  sum is  unity.) Thus, t he  range space has  dimension N-1. This 
difference of N{(N-I)!-11 is  zero if and only if t h e r e  are only two alteratives.  
Therefore,  if N 2 3, other  relationships with resulting paradoxes can be  added. 
This is illustrated by Theorem 3. 
This dimensional argument also proves that ,  f o r  N 2 4, Theorem 3 is  not t he  
"best possible" resul t .  To see this, w e  need t o  descr ibe t he  comparison mapping L 
fo r  Theorem 3. The f i r s t  N components of L a r e  given by E ( A ) ,  t h e  next N-1 by 
the expected value of the  weighted voting method defined by W N - ~ ,  etc .  The last 
N ( N  - I ) /  2 components are given by the  expressions P(Ak)  - P(A,) ,k  < j . Thus, 
the  range space f o r  L is  
Si ( N )  X Si  ( N  -1) x.. . X S ( 3 )  x J ~ ( ~  -I)' 
where J  is  t h e  interval [ - l l ]  This range space has  t h e  dimension 
N + ( N  -1)+...+3 + I (N)(N -1 ) /21  = N~ - N - 1 .  For t h e  model described in t he  
theorem, t he  difference between the  dimensions of t he  domain and the  range is 
N !  - N~ + N. This value is  positive if and only if N 2 4. 
Corollary 3.7 
Let N 2 4. In addition t o  t he  subsets of alternatives described in Theorem 3, 
N !  - N~ + N additional relationships involving the  rankings of t h e  N alternatives 
can be  defined in such a way tha t ,  f o r  certain profiles of voters ,  t h e  resul ts  are 
independent of t he  rankings obtained in Theorem 3. 
A simple dimensional argument shows tha t  even if Theorem 3 can be  extended from 
nested sets of t h r e e  o r  more alternatives t o  all  possible subsets of alternatives,  
f o r  N t 4 additional relationships can still be  found. 
To complete ou r  description of L ,  notice tha t  t h e  comparison value on each 
simplex in t he  range is  the  point of complete indifference N - ~ E ~ .  For each of the  
intervals J ,  the  comparison value is  0. Thus, t he  comparison point i s  
Therefore Theorem 3 is an  example of Theorem 2 where M and N are manifolds and 
where t h e  comparison point is not t he  origin of a Euclidean space. 
The comparison mapping L is  linear. Therefore L -'(0) must be  a l inear sub- 
space with dimension N! - N~ + N. If N > 3 this space must intersect  t he  boundary 
of Si(N!). A boundary point of Si(N!) corresponds to a profile of voters  where 
none of t h e  voters  rank the  alternatives in cer ta in  ways. This extreme boundary 
behavior describes the  limits of t he  voting paradox. A special case is described in 
Corollary 3.2. 
Corollary 3.8 
Let N 2 4. The resul ts  in Theorem 3 can be  obtained with profiles of vo te rs  
where no vote r  ha s  cer ta in  rankings of t he  alternatives. 
W e  have not t r i ed  to find a general characterization of t he  boundary behavior. 
The proof of Theorem 3 involves showing tha t  t h e  l inear comparison map has 
maximal rank. The rank condition does not hold if Wk,k = 3, ..., N are Borda vec- 
tors .  I t  tu rns  out that  L has  corank (with respec t  t o  t he  range space) of at least 
IN(N - 1 ) / 2 ]  - 1. This means t ha t  although a Borda election ranking admits incon- 
sistencies with respec t  t o  a given binary ranking method, not all possible incon- 
sistencies are admitted. In par t icular ,  Theorem 3 does no t  hold if even  one of the  
Wk is a Borda vector .  A di rec t  verification of this f o r  N = 3 is  given in Section 4. 
With only slight modifications, these resul ts  can be  used to descr ibe cer ta in  
ranking procedures  coming from probability and statist ics.  For instance, suppose 
N forms are making the  same product, and they are t o  be  ranked based on the  qual- 
ity of the i r  products. In Theorem 3, identify the  "ith alternative" with the  "ith 
firm" the  "t  th voter"  with t he  "jth vector  sample" of t he  product taken from each 
of the  N firms, and the  "jth voter ' s  preference ranking" with t he  l inear "quality 
ranking" of the  products in the  jth sample. The relationship ak > aj means tha t ,  
based upon the  samples, form k ' s  product appears  t o  be  superior  to firm j ' s .  It  
follows from Corollary 3.1 tha t  any possible choice of binary rankings is realized 
by an open set of data  points. Binary sampling approaches need not lead t o  a 
linear ordering of the  "quality of the  firms". Indeed, in this way, t he  well-known 
Steinhaus-Trybula paradox (Steinhaus and 'Trybula, 1959), where the  final ranking 
of t h r e e  forms is al  > a 2 , a 2  > a 3, but a3 > al, becomes a special case of Corol- 
l a ry  3.1. 
I t  follows from Theorem 3 that,  even if t he  firms are ranked by use of weight- 
ed ranking methods, t he  resul ts  could be  difficult t o  interpret .  For instance, t he  
weight vectors  W, = (LO, ..., 0)  correspond t o  t he  natural ranking method based on 
P ( q  = maxIXf:j E Ak j). I t  follows from t h e  above that ,  should some one firm be  
deleted, t h e  revised ranking could drastically change. Other measures experience 
similar problems. A similar effect occurs  fo r  t he  scoring of athletic events where 
a voter 's  ranking corresponds t o  how the  various teams are placed in a par t icular  
event,  etc. 
A s  a final amusing example, note tha t  a connoisseur is often described as a 
person whose taste preferences  a r e  based upon several  a t t r ibutes  (e.g., t he  color,  
the  tas te ,  and the bouquet of a wine), and whose rankings are based on an  aggrega- 
tion of them. If so,  w e  should not expect his binary comparisons t o  define a transi- 
tive ordering. This is, of course,  an N alternative version of the  famous folklore 
"pie" example (I p r e f e r  "apple" t o  "cherry", but if "blueberry" is available, then 
my choice is  "cherry"). 
A s  in Section 2, t h e r e  exis t  open sets in t he  domain which exhibit each of t he  
above behaviors. Consequently, these examples cannot be  dismissed as being iso- 
lated; t he  behavior is robust.  A s  t he  number of agents increases ( the denomina- 
t o r s  of the  rational points become larger) ,  so do the number of t h e  possible exam- 
ples, which leads us t o  t he  following corollary.  
Corollary 3.9 
Consider a system of weighted voting methods as described in Theorem 3. Let 
Q denote an outcome ove r  t he  various sets as described in Theorem 3. Let n (Q,m) 
be  the  probability tha t  the  election resul t  f o r  a group of m voters  is  Q. Assume 
tha t  t h e  profiles of voters  are uniformly distributed. Then, as m -, w,n(Q,m) ap- 
proaches t he  r a t i o  of t he  area of L -'(Q) to the  area of t he  simplex Si (N!). 
For elementary number theoret ic  reasons,  t he  sequence [n (Q ,m ) may not be  
monotone. The limit is  positive if L -'(Q) contains an  open set; this  is  t r u e  whenev- 
e r  Q does not admit ties. For o ther  distributions, the  ra t io  is determined in a simi- 
l a r  fashion, but with a different measure. 
4. PROOFS 
The proof of Theorem 2 is  obvious. To prove Theorem 3, w e  f i r s t  prove Corol- 
lary 3.1. 
Proof of Corollary 3.1 
List the pa i r s  of alternatives in the  following order :  the  f i r s t  pa i r  is (a l , az ) ,  
the  second set of two pa i r s  is  given by ( a j  , a t ) .  j = 1.2, and the  j t h  set of k pairs  
is given by (a, , ak  +1), j = 1 ,... , k ; k = 3 ,... ,N -1. A ranking of t he  N alternatives de- 
fines an tN(N -I)/ 2 ]-dimensional vector  in the  following way. The j th  component 
is determined by the  ranking of the  j t h  pai r  of alternatives. This component is  1 if 
t he  f i r s t  listed alternative is  p r e f e r r ed  t o  t h e  second; otherwise, i t  is -1. For ex- 
ample, the  vector  associated with t he  preference ranking al > az > ... > a~ has 
the  value 1 in all t he  components. 
Because the  N alternatives can be  ranked in N! different ways, the  comparis- 
on map is a linear mapping from Si (N!) t o  J ~ ( ~ - ~ ) ' ~  where J is the  interyal [-1.11 
and t h e  comparison point is  0. (this map defines a convex combination of t h e  
above N! vectors.) We must show tha t  t h e r e  i s  a point p in the  inter ior  of Si (N!) 
such tha t  (i) p is  in the  preimage of 0 and (ii) t he  Jacobian of t h e  comparison map 
at p has  full rank. Let p = (~!)- '( l ,  ..., 1).  Because p is  t he  profile where t h e r e  
are equal numbers of voters  f o r  each of t he  N! possible ways t o  rank  t h e  alterna- 
tives, p is  mapped t o  0. 
The comparison mapping is  l inear,  so  j t  has a matrix representation. The ma- 
t r i x  is  the  Jacobian, and i t  consists of the  N! column vectors  defined above. I t  
remains t o  show tha t  this  set of N! vectors  includes N(N-1)/2 linearly indepen- 
dent vectors.  
Consider the  vectors  Vj , j = 1, ..., N(N -1)/2, where 5 has t h e  value 1 f o r  the  
f i r s t  IN(N -1)/Z J - ( j  -1) component and -1 f o r  the  remaining components. This 
set of vectors  is  linearly independent. This is because they form a square a r r a y  
where t he  entr ies  on and above the  diagonal from the  lower left-hand co rne r  t o  the  
upper  tight-hand co rne r  are all equal t o  1. A l l  the  o the r  entries are -1. 
There a r e  zN vectors  with entr ies  of e i ther  1 o r  -1. Most of them are not re- 
lated t o  t he  described ranking method. So, t o  complete t he  proof, i t  remains t o  
show tha t  each 5 is associated with one of the  N! rankings of t he  alternatives. The 
choice of t he  components and t h e  vectors  5 makes thi; fairly simple. The vector  
Vl corresponds t o  t he  ranking a > a2 > ... > a,,,. Vectr .- V2 has -1 only in t h e  last 
component; this corresponds to  a transposition of aN and aN-, .  These two alterna- 
tives are adjacent in the  f i r s t  ranking, so  the ranking f o r  V2 can b e  obtained from 
the ranking f o r  Vl by transposing these alternatives. This defines the  ranking 
a ,  > a2 > ... > U N - Z  > a~ > a ~ - ~ .  
Indeed, the only difference between Vj and is in one component. This 
component ref lects  a change in the ranking of precisely one pa i r  of alternatives. 
By construction, these two alternatives are adjacent in the  ranking Rkj tha t  is as- 
sociated with ?. Therefore,  the ranking fo r  V, is obtained by transposing these 
two adjacent alternatives in R k j .  This completes the  proof. 
This proof is based on the  fac t  tha t  the -1's in the  square a r r a y  correspond t o  
the N-1 adjacent transpositions required t o  move aN from last place in 
al > a2 > ... > a~ t o  first .  This defines N  -1 rankings where the last  one is 
aN > al  > a2  > ... > a ~ - ~ .  Next, move aN-l from what is now last  place t o  second, 
etc. 
Proof of Theorem 3 
Let the  weight vectors  Wk,k = 3 ,  ..., N ,  be  as specified in t he  statement of the  
theorem. With each ranking of the N alternatives, w e  associate a vector  with 
[ N  ( N  -1) / 2 J + 3  + . . . + N components. The f i r s t  N ( N  -1) / 2  components a r e  defined 
as above. The next t h ree  are given by the  appropriate  permutation of Wa t o  
correspond to  the  specified ranking. For instance, the  ranking a2 > a g  > al i s  
identified with the  vector ( w 3 , w l l w 2 ) .  In general, t he  s e t  of k  components is the  
appropriate  permutation of Wk t o  ref lect  the ranking of t he  k  alternatives, 
k  = 3 ,  ... , N .  The comparison mapping L which is a mapping from Si ( N ! )  t o  
P (N-1)'2 X Si ( 3 )  X... X Si ( N )  is  described in Section 3.  The point p described 
above is mapped t o  the comparison point ( 0 , O  ,... ,0; ( 1  / 3)Ea ,... , (1  / N)EN). 
Because L is  l inear,  i ts  matrix representation defines the Jacobian. This ma- 
t r ix  has  N !  column' vectors  with IN (N - I ) /  2  j + 3  + ... + N = N' - 3  components. 
(The dimension of the  range space is smaller; i t  has  dimension N'-N - 1.  The 
difference results from the  constraints defining the  N -2 simplices Si (k  ) in the im- 
age space.) W e  must show tha t  t he re  are N' - 3  linearly independent vectors. 
In the proof of the corollary, : i set of N ( N  -1) / 2 vectors  tha t  are independent 
in the f i r s t  N ( N - 1 ) / 2  compo~:~nts w e r e  found. To obtain the remaining 
!N(N+1) /  2 1-3 independent vecto! s, take the  vector  associated with each of the  N !  
rankings and add i t  t o  t he  vector  associated with t h e  reversa l  of this ranking. 
Each of the  f i r s t  N(N -I)/ 2 components of t h e  vector  associated with t h e  reversed 
ranking will differ in sign from the  original vector.  Therefore,  t he  sum vectors  
will have zeros  in each of these f i r s t  N(N-1)/2 components. Consequently, these 
new vectors  are orthogonal t o  the  range space used in t he  proof of Corollary 3.1. 
All  w e  need t o  do is t o  show tha t  these new vectors  contain a set of 1N(N + I)/ 21-3 
independent vectors.  
For a r eve r se  neutral  vector ,  these new vectors  are all  multiplies of EN. In 
all o ther  cases ,  t he  j t h  component has  t h e  value wj  + W ~ - j + l .  For instance, fo r  
t he  voting vector  (4, 3, O), the  new vector  corresponding t o  t he  rankings 
a > b > c and c > b > a is  (4, 6, 4). The vector  corresponding t o  a > c > b an 
b > c > a is  (4, 4, 6). In general,  these new vectors  would correspond to a voting 
vector except  t ha t  they do not satisfy t h e  monotonicity condition. However, t he  
resul ts  given by Saar i  (1984) hold even f o r  vectors  t ha t  do not satisfy these mono- 
tonicity propert ies .  Therefore,  the  above reduces t o  a special  case of t he  one 
given by Saar i  (1984). This completes t h e  proof. 
Proof that a Borda weight vector does not work for N = 3 
Assume tha t  t he  alternatives are a , b ,  and c .  assume tha t  t h e  Borda weight 
vector is  B3 = (3,2,1). The comparison mapping is  l inear and its image includes t h e  
comparison point (0,0,0;6,6,6). (B3 is  not normalized, and s o  t he  sum of t h e  com- 
ponents of Si (3) is  6.) 
The comparison regions in Si (3) are identified with t he  l inear rankings of t he  
t h r ee  alternatives.  To obtain them, note that  if the  axes  of R~ are labeled in t he  
usual z, y , z  notation, then the  region z > y corresponds to a > b  , y > z 
corresponds t o  b  > c , z > z corresponds to c > a ,  etc. In this way, t he  simplex 
Si (3) is  divided into six open sets which are defined by t h e  intersection of t he  sim- 
plex with t he  t h r e e  hyperplanes z = y ,y = z ,  and z = z (see Saar i  (1978, 1982)). 
Suppose tha t  the  different behaviors described in t he  theorem hold for B3. 
This means tha t  t h e  image of t h e  comparison mapping meets each of t he  six regions 
of Si (3) as well as all  of t he  open regions in J ~ .  In all, i t  would meet 48 open re- 
gions. If this happens, then, by the  linearity of t he  mapping and a comparison of 
the  dimensions of t he  domain and range, i t  follows tha t  t he  mapping is  onto a neigh- 
borhood of t he  c~mpar i son  point. This forces  t h e  matrix t o  be  of rank five. To 
show tha t  this id not so, w e  l ist  all six of the  vectors  and then ex t r ac t  a four- 
dimensional basis. 
The vectors  are as follows: 
These six vectors  admit a basis consisting of t he  f i r s t  t h r ee  vectors  and the  vector  
(0,0,0; 1,1,1). Thus, the system has corank 2. Since this  last vector  is orthogonal 
t o  the  image space, the  system has corank 2 with respec t  t o  the image space. This, 
and the linearity of the  mapping, means that  the  comparison mapping has a nonzero 
intersection with 1 2  of the 48 admissible comparison regions. If the  mapping were 
always consistent, then the  mapping would meet only 3! = 6 regions. Thus, the  map- 
ping still admits several  "inconsistent" conclusions. (In a paper  being prepared,  
we character ize the  election rankings admitted by a Bol;da count.) 
Extension of Theorem 3 
The last  p a r t  of the proof of Theorem 3 is  based on the  work of Saar i  (1984) 
which admits a wider variety of results. For example, f o r  k alternatives, suppose 
the re  a r e  k -1 weight vectors  Wk, which form, with Ek, a linearly independent set. 
Arbitrarily choose k -1 rankings of the  k alternatives. The theorem asserts tha t  
t he re  exist  voters '  profiles so  tha t  when the  s a m e  voters rank the  se t  of k alterna- 
tives, k = 3, ..., N with the  i t h  voting vector,  then the  outcome is t he  i th  specified 
ranking of t h e  alternatives. This is t r u e  f o r  all  choices of i  = 1, ..., k -1 and k. 
A similar extension holds f o r  Theorem 3. For each k = 3, ..., N, choose 
k - 1 - k / 2  voting vectors with the  following property: (i) t he  voting vector  is 
not r eve r se  neutral, and (ii) the  se t  of k -k / 2  vectors,  defined by Ek and the  vec- 
t o r s  formed by adding each of the  k - 1 - k / 2 voting vectors t o  i ts  reversal ,  is  a 
linearly independent set .  For each voting vector,  arbi t rar i ly  choose a ranking of 
the  k alternatives. For each pa i r  of alternatives, designate one of them. There 
exist  voters '  profiles so tha t  when the  i th  voting vector is used t o  rank the  k al- 
ternatives t he  outcome is the assigned ranking i  = l ,  ... ,k - l[/ 21, k = 3, ... ,N. For 
each pair ,  a majority of the  same voters  p r e f e r  the  designated alternative. The 
proof of this statement is a straightforward modification of the proof of Theorem 
3. 
Proof of Corollary 3.2 
From Corollary 3.1, i t  follows t h a t  t h e r e  is a n  open set of voters '  profi les 
where t h e  outcome in pairwise elections is  t h e  cycle 
Consider t h e  r e v e r s e d  cycle  al  < aN < a ~ - ~  < ... < a2 < a l .  The following defines 
an  agenda where aj will b e  t h e  winner. Let  t h e  agenda b e  t h e  N terms in t h e  re- 
versed  cycle t h a t  start with t h e  a l ternat ive  immediately following aj  and ends  with 
aj . For  example, a3  wins with t h e  agenda [a2,al ,aN,a,  -l,... ,a4 ,a3] .  
The second p a r t  of th is  corol lary  is  a consequence of t h e  boundary p r o p e r t i e s  
of L -l(0). The second p a r t  of th is  corol lary  is  a consequence of t h e  boundary 
p r o p e r t i e s  of L-l(0). The profi le,  where  a n  equal number of v o t e r s  have each  of 
t h e  t h r e e  rankings a l  > a2 > ... > a ~ , a ~  > a3 > ... > a~ > al l  and 
a3 > aq  > ... > aN > al  > a2 h a s  t h e  des i red proper t ies .  Note t h a t  in each  pair -  
2 
wise comparison t h e  winning a l t e rna t ive  rece ives  e i t h e r  - of t h e  vote,  o r  al l  of it! 
3 
This is  t r u e  f o r  whichever agenda is  used and whichever a l t e rna t ive  wins. 
The dice example 
This is  a s t ra ightforward computation. However, t h e  domain point  used in t h e  
image of t h e  comparison point should correspond t o  two identical weighted, bu t  not 
f a i r ,  dice.  The probabil i ty t h a t  a par t i cu la r  f ace  will su r face  is l e f t  t o  t h e  end of 
t h e  computation. In o t h e r  words, t h e r e  are some complications in t h e  computation 
with two f a i r  dice. 
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